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THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL ACCESS INCLUDES
COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION: THE NEED
FOR A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
DISABLED PERSONS TO ENFORCE THE AIR
CARRIER ACCESS ACT OF 1986
I. INTRODUCTION
Persons with disabilities have faced a long tradition of
discrimination in areas such as employment, program servic-
es, and transportation. "Handicapped persons have been
characterized by many observers as the 'newest' minority,
because over the last several decades the demands of handi-
capped individuals and groups representing them have result-
ed in the development of significant protections and reme-
dies for the handicapped by Congress and the courts."' In
1973, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act2 which was
intended to be a major piece of civil rights legislation on
behalf of disabled individuals.' Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act4 absolutely prohibits discrimination against disabled
persons' by recipients6 of federal financial assistance. 7 It
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1. Comment, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Is There An Implied Right of
Action Under Section 504?, 49 TENN. L. REV. 577, 578 (1982) (citing Selwyn,
Handicappers' Rights: Emphasizing Individual Needs, TRIAL, 47 (Feb. 1981). This
comment provides an overview of the implication doctrine as applied to the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
3. Comment, supra note 1, at 578. For an analysis of barriers faced by
persons with disabilities and the legal issues involved, see United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Disabilities, 81 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE PUBLICATION (Sept. 1983).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, is generally referred to as Section 504 and will be referred to
as such in this comment. Section 504 provides that:
[N]o otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United
States, as defined [by this title], shall, solely by reason of his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Stpp. IV 1987).
5. Section 504 regulations define an "individual with handicaps" to be "[A]ny
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provides that no disabled person who is qualified' for partic-
ipation in a federally funded program or activity shall be
denied access to that program or activity merely because of
his or her disability.
9
Congress has not acted as quickly, however, to prevent
discrimination against disabled persons in the area of trans-
portation. Consider the following situation: A disabled wom-
an, who uses a collapsible, manual, wheelchair, purchases a
round-trip ticket on a major commercial airline. She is on
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impair-
ment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)
(Supp. IV 1986). The Research and Training Center on Independent Living at the
University of Kansas has published guidelines which generally describe terms which
are preferred when referring to persons with disabilities. The term "disability" is a
general term for a functional limitation. The term "handicap" is not considered to
be a synonym for "disability"; it is thought to describe a "condition or barrier
imposed by society, the environment, or by one's own self." Therefore, the term
"disabled" is used in this comment to refer to persons with disabilities. RESEARCH
AND TRAINING CENTER ON INDEPENDENT LIVING, GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING AND
WRITING ABOUT PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (1984) (available at the Media Project,
Research and Training Center on Independant Living, 348 Haworth Hall, Universi-
ty of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045). However, the term "handicapped" is used
in most federal and state laws referring to disabled persons. When referring to
such laws, the term "handicapped" will be used.
6. The Department of Health and Human Services was charged with pro-
mulgating regulations to give effect to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. These regulations apply to each recipient of federal financial assistance from
the Department of Health and Human Services and to each program or activity
that benefits from that assistance. 45 C.F.R. § 84.2 (1989). Section 504 regulations,
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, define "recipient"
as:
[A]ny state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a state
or its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution,
organization, or other entity, or any person to which Federal financial
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient, including
any successor, assignee, or transferee of a recipient, but excluding the
ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
Id. § 84.3.
7. Section 504 regulations define federal financial assistance as "any grant,
loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of insurance or
guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the Department provides or other-
wise makes available assistance in the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal
personnel; or (3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such
property . . . ." Id.
8. Section 504 regulations define a "qualified handicapped person" with re-
spect to services as one "who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of such services." Id.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
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her way to a business meeting. She tells the ticketing agent
at the time she purchases her ticket that she is disabled and
uses a wheelchair. On three subsequent occasions prior to
her initial flight, she informs an airline representative that
she is disabled and will be travelling with a collapsible wheel-
chair. Each time the passenger is told that her disability and
use of a wheelchair will in no way interfere with the airline's
ability to transport her. When the passenger arrives at the
airport to depart on her initial flight, she finds that the
plane will be boarded from the field level instead of through
a jetway. Because the airline has not provided for appropri-
ate boarding procedures, the passenger must be carried up
the stairs into the airplane. Upon arriving at the flight's desti-
nation airport, the passenger inquires about her return flight
at the end of the week. She is informed by an airline repre-
sentative that she will not be allowed to travel on that flight
without an attendant. The passenger is stranded. In this situ-
ation what recourse is available for the passenger?'0
In 1986, Congress recognized the inequity and unpre-
dictability confronting disabled travellers" by amending sec-
tion 404 of the Federal Aviation Act of 19582 to include
the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986." The Air Carrier Ac-
10. These facts are a variation of those which occurred in Cupolo v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., A. Delaware Corporation, Wings West Airlines, Inc., and are
typical of situations encountered by disabled air travellers on a regular basis.
Disabled passengers face a variety of problems in air travel ranging from complete
denial of services to the requirement that they be accompanied by an attendant.
In addition, these requirements are often imposed arbitrarily and inconsistently,
leaving disabled passengers with no ability to predict the outcome of their travel
plans.
11. S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2329.
12. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
13. The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 reads:
(c) Prohibition on discrimination against qualified handicapped indi-
viduals
(1) No air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provi-
sion of air transportation.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection the
term "handicapped individual" means any individual who has a physi-
cal or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as
having such an impairment.
Id. § 1374(c) (Supp. IV 1987). This amendment is known as the Air Carrier Ac-
cess Act of 1986 and will be referred to as such in this comment. Air Carrier
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cess Act prohibits discrimination by air carriers 4 against
passengers on the basis of disability." The amendment fur-
ther provides that within one hundred and twenty days of its
enactment, the Secretary of Transportation will promulgate
regulations to "ensure non-discriminatory treatment of qual-
ified handicapped individuals consistent with safe carriage of
all passengers on air carriers.""6 The Department of
Transportation issued final regulations pursuant to this
amendment on March 6, 1990."
However, the Air Carrier Access Act does not expressly
create a private right of action for damages for persons in-
jured by a violation of the Act. Without a private right of
action, the individual is unable to challenge the exact type of
discrimination which the Act was designed to prohibit.
This comment will focus on the need for an express or
implied private right of action that would allow individuals to
redress acts of discrimination under the Air Carrier Access
Act of 1986. The first section will address the background of
the implied right of action doctrine. This will include a dis-
cussion of the current test applied by the United States Su-
preme Court when determining whether or not an implied
right of action should be found.'. The next section will
present a discussion of the problem created by the fact that
there is no private right of action available under the Act.
An analysis of the problem in the context of the four factor
test applied by the Supreme Court will follow. Finally, a sam-
ple statute which creates an express right of action under the
Air Carrier Access Act will be presented.
Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c) (Supp. V 1987)).
14. Air carrier is defined in the Federal Aviation Act as "any citizen of the
United States who undertakes, whether directly or indirectly or by a lease or any
other arrangement, to engage in air transportation .... " 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1987).
15. Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (Supp. IV (1987)).
16. Id.
17. 55 Fed. Reg. 8008 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382 and 49 C.F.R. §
27).
18. The United States Supreme Court is currently using a four factor test set
forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) to determine whether to imply a private
right of action when none is provided by a statute. For a discussion of tihe devel-
opment of the Coil test and its application, see infra notes 45-57 and accompany.
ing text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Implication Doctrine
In 1916, the United States Supreme Court first recog-
nized a private individual's right to obtain a remedy in fed-
eral court for injuries caused by a violation of a federal stat-
ute not expressly providing for a private right of action. t9
In Texas & Paciflc Railway v. Rigsby,2° the Court held that
an implied remedy would be found if a statute expressly pro-
tects a specific class of persons and if the plaintiff is a mem-
ber of that benefitted class. In 1964, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of an implied private right of action in the
area of securities regulation."' The Court's decisions in this
area led to great expansion in the implication doctrine.
1. Implied Private Right of Action Under the Securities Act
of 1934
In J. Case Co. v. Borak,2" the Court unanimously held
that a corporate shareholder could sue for damages which
resulted from the circulation of a false and misleading proxy
statement in violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
contains no language expressly creating such a right of ac-
tion. However, it does prohibit the circulation of false and.
19. Texas and Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). See Schneider, Implying
Private Rights and Remedies Under The Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L. REV. 853
(1984) (addressing the implication doctrine in the area of securities regulation, an
area in which it has been heavily applied). For an in depth overview of the
implication doctrine, see generally Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication,
and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501
(1986).
20. 241 U.S. at 39. Rigsby was a switchman working in the Texas and Pacific
Railroad's yard crew. While performing his duties, lie fell from one of the cars
due to a defect in one of the hand holds that formed the rungs of a ladder. He
sued for damages based on the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 44 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1982). In this case, the United States Supreme Court implied a private right of
action under the Act. Id. at 36.
21. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Bomk, the Supreme Court
held that a private right of action is available to redress violations of section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in both direct and derivative cases. Id. at
430-31.
22. 377 U.S. at 430. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
located at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
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misleading proxy statements. 23 In Borak, the Supreme Court
recognized the shareholder's right to bring the action, and
for the first time stated that it was proper to imply a private
right of action from a provision of a federal statute at least
when the provision prohibited the particular conduct in-
volved.24
In developing a rationale for allowing a private right of
action to be implied from section 14(a), the Court in Borak
first examined the legislative intent behind section 14(a). 5
The Court found that the purpose of section 14(a) "is to
prevent management or others from obtaining authorization
for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate
disclosure in proxy solicitation."26 Second, the Court looked
to the language in section 14(a) which allows the Commis-
sion to use its rules and regulations as necessary for the pub-
lic interest or the protection of investors. According to the
Court, this language "implies the availability of judicial relief
where necessary to achieve that result."2 7 Third, the Court
23. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, by the use 9f the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of
a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1988).
24. Borak, 377 U.S. at 426. See generally Schneider, supra note 19, at 863.
25. Id. at 431.
26. Id. The Court found that section 14(a) stemmed from "the Congressional
belief that '[F]air corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to
every equity security bought on a public exchange.'" d. (citing H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1984)). "It was intended to control the conditions
tinder which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of
abuses which ... [had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of the
stockholders." Id. at 431 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess., 14).
"Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the stockholder of the real
nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought." Id. at 431
(citing S. REP. No. 792, 73 Cong., 2nd Sess., 12). See generally Schneider, supra
note 19, at 865.
27. Borah, 377 U.S. at 432. The Court considered language in section 14(a)
making it,
unlawful for any person ... to solicit or permit the use of his name
to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any
security . . . registered on any national securities exchange in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pro-
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believed that private enforcement of the proxy rules comple-
mented action taken by the Securities Exchange Commission
because the Commission was, in all likelihood, unable to
examine the factual accuracy of proxy statements filed.2"
The Court concluded that these three factors indicated that
Congress intended to create a private right of action and
remedy when it enacted section 14(a).2"
In later decisions, the Supreme Court continued to im-
ply a private right of action under the federal securities
laws.3° Subsequently, the Court began to imply a private
right of action under legislation involving civil rights, includ-
ing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
2. Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enact-
ed to bring disabled persons into the mainstream of soci-
ety."' The goals of the Rehabilitation Act were to (1) guar-
antee equal rights for handicapped persons in federal pro-
grams;32 (2) "encourage the development and implementa-
tion of rehabilitation services for all handicapped persons,
particularly extending services to severely disabled persons
who had not been served in the past";3 (3) "encourage re-
habilitation agencies to serve disabled persons who might not
have vocational goals in the traditional sense, but who would
nonetheless benefit from appropriate rehabilitation servic-
es";4 and (4) "provide a means for coordination of scientif-
ic and technical research in areas which would be of direct
benefit to disabled persons."3  "In short, this Act was de-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1982)). See generally Schneider, supra note 19, at
865.
28. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432. See generally Schneider, supra note 19, at 865.
29. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433.
30. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971).
31. Comment, supra note 1, at 580.
32. The 504 Notice: Moving Towans a Civil Rights Act?, AMICUS, July 1976 at
12.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
1990] 1013
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signed to guarantee the civil rights of handicapped per-
sons."
36
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination
against qualified handicapped persons by any program or
activity which is a recipient of federal financial assistance. 7
The Act was amended in 1978 to provide that the "remedies,
procedures, and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964" were available to disabled persons who
were aggrieved under section 504."
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was itself amended to apply
only to programs created by Congress for the primary pur-
pose of providing employment.3 9 However, in Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Darrone40 the Supreme Court rejected the "pri-
mary objective" test as applied to section 504. In doing so,
the Court held that section 504 prohibits discrimination by
any program or activity receiving any federal financial assis-
tance and that the rights and remedies of Title VI are avail-
able against any recipient of such aid.41 In so holding, the
Court implicitly recognized the right of a private individual
to bring a cause of action under section 504, even though
the statute itself does not expressly provide for it.42
In 1975, the Supreme Court limited the implied private
right of action in Cort v. Ash.4" The four factor test devel-
oped in Cort has been accepted as the Court's standard when
implying a private right of action.44
36. Comment, supra note 1, at 581.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). For the text of Section 504 and
corresponding definitions, see supra notes 4-8.
1 38. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2983 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1982)).
39. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 604, 78 Stat. 241, 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982)).
40. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
41. Id. at 632-33 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court analyzed the language
of section 504, as well as the legislative history, executive interpretation, and the
purpose of Congress when enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in concluding
that section 504 was not limited to programs where a primary objective of the
financial assistance was to provide employment. Id. at 630-33 (citing Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
42. Id. For a general discussion of the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of section 504, see Summary, Analysis & Commentary, 8 MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 262 (1984).
43. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
44: For a detailed discussion of the development of the implication doctrine
[Vol. 301014
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3. Cort v. Ash and Its Progeny
Prior to Cort v. Ash, the United States Supreme Court
did not employ any particular standard to determine whether
or not a private right of action should be implied when a
statute does not expressly provide for such a right.45 How-
ever, as subsequent cases established, the single most impor-
tant factor in determining whether a private right of action
should be implied when a statute is silent is whether Con-
gress intended to create such a right.46 The Supreme Court
set forth the four factors to be used in determining the exis-
tence of such Congressional intent in the landmark decision
of Cort v. Ash.47
The first Cort factor is whether or not the plaintiff is a
member of a class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted. 8 In other words, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Did Congress intend to protect
the plaintiff? The Court examined the legislative history and
language of the statute in question to determine whether this
requirement was met.49
and the Corn factors, see infra notes 45-57 and the accompanying text.
45. See generally Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412
(1975); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); T.I.M.E. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464 (1959).
46. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ("[O]ur task
is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private
right of action asserted . . . ."); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) ("The key to the inquiry is intent of tile
Legislature."); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451
U.S. 77, 91 (1980) ("The ultimate question ... is whether Congress intended to
create the private remedy ... that the plaintiff seeks to invoke.").
47. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Con, a stockholder brought suit against Bethlehem
Steel Corporation for damages and injunctive relief because of allegations in
connection with the 1972 Presidential election that the corporation's directors had
authorized campaign contributions from corporate funds. Jurisdiction was alleged
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 18 U.S.C. § 610, as well as a pendant claim under
Delaware law. Id. at 70-71. The principal question addressed by the Court was
whether a private right of action for damages against corporate directors is to be
implied in favor of a corporate stockholder under 18 U.S.C § 610. Section 610
criminalizes the corporation when the corporation makes contributions in connec-
tion with presidential and vce-presidential elections. Id. at 68. The United States
Supreme Court, in stating its four factor test, held that there was no private right
of action under 18 U.S.C. § 610. Id. at 85.
48. Coit, 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S,
33 (1916)).
49. Id. at 80. The Court stated that 18 U.S.C. § 610 was concerned not with
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The second Cort factor is whether there is any indication
of implicit or explicit legislative intent to create or deny a
private right of action.5" After examining the legislative his-
tory of the statute, the Court found that although in certain
situations it is not necessary to show an intent to create a
private right of action, in certain situations it is clear that a
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights.
However, an explicit purpose to deny a private right of ac-
tion would be controlling.5 '
The third Cort factor is whether it is "consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff."52 In analyzing this factor the
Court looked to whether the remedy sought would aid the
primary goal of Congress when enacting the law in ques-
tion.5"
The fourth Cort factor is whether the cause of action is
one that is traditionally relegated to state law.54 The Court
considers whether the area in question is so basically one of
the States' concern that it would be inappropriate to imply a
cause of action based solely on federal law.55
the internal relations between corporations and stockholders, but with corporations
as a source of aggregated wealth with the potential for being a corrupting in-
fluence. Therefore, the Court found that section 610 differs from other criminal
statutes in which private causes of action have been implied because there was a
clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff. Id. at 82.
50. Id. at 78. (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974)).
51. Id. at 82. The Court found that there was no indication in the legislative
history to suggest a Congressional intent to allow stockholders a federal right to
damages for a violation of section 610. Id. The Court stated that if it was dubious
as to whether Congress intended to allow the plaintiffs to have greater rights than
those provided by state regulation of corporations, the fact that there is no indica-
tion of Congressional intent to allow a private right of action indicates that the
relationship between corporations and stockholders was intended to be enforced
by state law. Id. at 83-84.
52. Id. at 82 (citing National Railroad, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S.
134 (1964) (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963))).
53. Id. at 84. The Court found that in this instance the remedy of a private
cause of action would not aid the primary goal of Congress, which was to curb
the influence which corporate funds may have in an election. The Court stated
that such a remedy would only allow corporate directors to "borrow" corporate
funds for a time; the later repayment of such funds might not be a deterrent to
such action and would not decrease the impact their use would have. Id.
54. Id. at 78.
55. Id. The Court found that corporations are creatures of state laws. Inves-
1016 [Vol. 30
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The Supreme Court currently relies upon the four Cort
factors to determine whether Congressional intent to imply a
private right of action exists.56 In the years since Cort, the
Court has decided several cases in which it has attempted to
clarify and solidify the relationship between the four factors.
a. Implied Private Right of Action After Cort v. Ash
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Cort, various inter-
pretations of these four factors have been used to imply
rights of action in many statutes.57 The Court has continued
to apply these factors emphasizing the need to determine
Congressional intent.58 According to the Supreme Court,
"what ultimately must be determined is whether Congress
intended to create the private remedy asserted."
59
In the first case decided after Cort, Cannon v. University
of Chicago,60 the Supreme Court authorized a private right
of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in
educational programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance.6 The Supreme Court held that the mere fact
that a federal statute has been violated and a person been
harmed does not automatically give rise to a private right of
action in favor of that person.62 Additionally, the Court stat-
ed that before a court could find Congressional intent to
tors contribute their funds to corporate directors based upon an understanding
that state law will govern the affairs of the corporation except where federal law
expressly requires otherwise. Id. at 84.
56. Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513, 516 (1988). Although a private
right of action was not implied in this case, the Court's reasoning and application
of the Coil analysis indicate that this test will continue to be used to determine
whether to imply a private right of action where a statute does not expressly
provide for one. See Bryson, Implied Private Rights of Action: Progress on the Road
Back From Chaos, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 143 (1988).
57. See infra notes 61-90 and accompanying text.
58. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 13 (1980); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 568 (1978).
59. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16
(1979).
60. 441 U.S. 677 (1978).
61. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982 & Supp. 1986); section 1681 provides that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
62. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1978).
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make a remedy available to a litigant, it must carefully ana-
lyze the four Cort factors.63 In so stating, the Court reaf-
firmed the Cort factors as a framework for implying a private
right of action when a statute does not expressly provide for
one.
In Cannon, the Court specifically mentioned the applica-
tion of the implication doctrine in civil rights statutes.64 It
stated that a private right of action should always be implied
where the statute creates a right in a class of persons and
the plaintiff is a member of that class.6 5 The Court rea-
soned that a statute which is "declarative of a civil right will
almost have to be stated in terms of a benefitted class. Put
somewhat differently, because the right to be free of discrim-
ination is a personal one . . . a statute conferring such a
right will almost have to be phrased in terms of the person
benefitted."66 Based on this language, some commentators
have noted that "[c]ivil rights statutes will therefore always
pass the Cort threshold test."
67
After Cannon, the Court attempted to clarify the Cort
factors in three additional decisions. In Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington,"8 the Court indicated its reluctance to imply a
private right of action. The Court stated that although the
central inquiry in determining the availability of an implied
private right of action is Congress' intent, the Cort factors are
not entitled to equal weight.6" In this case, an analysis of
the first three factors was sufficient to show that there was
no indication of Congressional intent to create the remedy
requested by the plaintiff because the statute itself did not
63. Id.
64. *Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-93 n. 13. See Mezey, Judicial Interprtation of Leg-
islative Intent: The Role of the Supreme Cou,1 in the Implication of Pivate Rights of
Action, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 53, 69 (1983) [hereinafter Mezey]. This article provides
an overview of the implication doctrine with a special emphasis on the differential
treatment which the Supreme Court has granted to civil rights statutes.
65. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-93 n.13.
66. Id.
67. Mezey, supra note 64, at 69.
68. 422 U.S. 560 (1978). The petitioner in this case filed suit for damages
alleging a violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which
requires brokers-dealers to keep records and file reports as required by the Secu-
rities Exchange Commission. Id. at 563-66. Section 17(a) does not provide a
private right of action in favor of anyone and the Supreme Court declined to
imply one based on an analysis of the Coti factors. Id. at 579.
69. Id. at 575.
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grant private rights to any individual class, nor did it pro-
scribe any conduct as unlawful.7" Therefore, the Court held
that the inquiry can be restricted to a determination of Con-
gressional intent, and no separate consideration of the final
factor was necessary.
7
'
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis,72 the
Court continued to struggle with its interpretation of the
Cort factors. In this case, the Court did find an implied right
of action to exist in. a shareholders' derivative action.73 The
Court relegated the first Cort factor to a mere threshold test
when it stated that "the mere fact that the statute was de-
signed to protect . . .clients does not require the implication
of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf."
74
However, the Court stated that the "dispositive question re-
mains whether Congress intended to create any such reme-
dy."75 This indicates that the first factor is necessary as a
threshold test, but is not sufficient on its own to meet the
standard in order for a court to imply a private right of ac-
tion.
The Court continued its discussion of the implication
doctrine and the Cort factors in California v. Sierra Club.76 In
70. Id. at 576.
71. Id. The Court stated that the legislative history of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 does not address the issue of private remedies under section 17(a).
"At least in cases such as this, the inquiry ends there; the question whether
Congress, either expressly or by implication, intended to create a private right of
action, has been definitely answered in the negative." Id.
72. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
73. Id. at 24. In TAMA, a stockholder of the petitioner brought suit in
federal district court as a derivative action on behalf of the petitioner arid as a
class action on behalf of its stockholders alleging a violation of the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. The Court found that section 215 of the Investment Advisors Act of
1940 contains language that implies a right to limited and specific relief in Feder-
al court. It states that contracts whose formulation or performance would violate
the Act "shall be void ... as regards the rights ofr the violator. Id. at 16-17. The
Court found that when Congress declared that certain contracts would be void, it
intended for the usual legal incidents of vokiness to occur, including the avail-
ability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction against the continued operation
of the contract, and for restitution. Id. at 19. Ther'efore, the Court held that a
limited private remedy exists under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to void
an investment advisors contract. Id. at 16-17.
76. 451 U.S. 287 (1980). In this case, section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1879 prohibits "[t]he creation of any obstruction not affirma-
tively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of
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this case, the Court, after analyzing the first two Cort factors,
found nothing in the language or legislative history of the
statute in question indicating that Congress intended to pro-
vide a private right of action in favor of the plaintiff."
Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no need to
examine the remaining two Cort factors.7" The Court found
that the final two factors are only relevant if the first two
factors show Congressional intent to create a remedy in the
plaintiff.79 In Sierra Club, the Court interpreted Congressio-
nal silence as a negative inference of a private right of action
by finding that the statute in question did not confer rights
upon a particular plaintiff."
In the most recent case interpreting the implication doc-
trine, Thompson v. Thompson, ' the Supreme Court moved
away from its recent restrictive position as exemplified in the
above cases, and toward a more moderate position concern-
ing the requirements for an implied private right of action
when a statute does not expressly provide for such action. 2
The Court stated that in determining whether to infer a pri
vate right of action from a federal statute the focal point is
congressional intent.8 3 In Thompson, the Court reaffirmed
the United States." Id. at 289. An environmental organization and two private
citizens filed suit to enjoin the construction and operation of water diversion
facilities which are part of the California Water Project as a violation of section
10. Id.
77. Id. at 297-98. The Court found that the language of the statute states
only a general proscription against certain activities. Id. at 294. It does not focus
on any particular class of beneficiaries. Id. Furthermore, the Court found that the
legislative history supports the view that the Act was designed to benefit the
public at large because it empowered the federal government to exercise its
authority over interstate commerce with regards to obstructions on navigable rivers
caused by bridges and other similar structures. Id. at 294-95.
78. Id. at 298.
79. Id. The Court stated that the final two factors are only of relevance if
the first two factors give an indication of Congressional intent to create the
remedy. Id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)).
80. Mezey, supra note 64, at 75.
81. 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988). In this case, a father filed suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act because of
conflicting state child custody decrees. Id. at 515.
82. Bryson, Implied Private Rights of Action: Progress on the Road Back From
Chaos, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 143 (1988).
83. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 516.
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the requirements that all four Cort factors be examined when
determining Congressional intent.8 4
Significantly, the Thompson Court did not require specific
evidence that Congress intended to create a private right of
action in order to make this determination. 5 As the Court
stated, the "implied cause of action doctrine would be a vir-
tual dead letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors
when Congress simply forgot to codify its evident intention
to provide a cause of action." 6 The Court recognized that
"the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly
create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally si-
lent or ambiguous on the question."" Therefore, Congres-
sional intent may appear "implicitly in the language or struc-
ture of the statute or in the circumstances of its enact-
ment.""8 This is significant in that it is more expansive than
the court's view in the past and may encourage lower courts
to infer private rights of action in appropriate cases.89
B. History of Lack of Access to Air Transportation
1. Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans
of America"
In 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act requir-
ing recipients of federal financial assistance to make their
programs, services, and employment opportunities accessible
to qualified disabled persons.9 In April, 1976, Executive
Order 11914 was issued ordering the United States Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), to develop
general guidelines for all funding agencies of the federal gov-
ernment to develop their own regulations for compliance
with section 504.92 In 1978, final guidelines were issued for
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667 (1978)).
88. Id. (citing Transamerica Mortgage Ad%isors (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979)).
89. Bryson, supra note 82, at 145.
90. 477 U.S. 597 (1986) [hereinafter DOT v. PVA].
91. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). For text of section 504 and
definitions, see supra notes 4-8.
92. Selwyn, Handicappeis' Rights: Emphasizing Individual Needs, TRIAL 47 (Feb.
1981).
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all federal executive agencies."3 Each governmental agency
was then authorized to draft and pass its own regulations,
following the HEW's guidelines, to ensure compliance with
Section 504."4
In 1979, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), began to
develop regulations in order to ensure compliance with sec-
tion 504."5 In order to do so, it relied on § 404 of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958,6 and extended beyond its specif-
ic section 504 authority in an attempt to apply its proposed
regulations for implementing non-discriminatory policies to
all commercial airlines, whether or not they were recipients
of direct financial assistance.9 7 The CAB's rationale for do-
ing so was based upon general statements in section 404
requiring the provision of adequate service to and
non-discrimination against disabled air travellers which are
applicable to all air carriers regardless of federal financial
93. Id. The guidelines were issued to all federal agencies to be used as "mini-
mum requirements" with regard to recipients of funds from each agency. The
recipients included "private contractors, colleges, schools, transit authorities,
state/county/municipal governments." Id.
94. Id. HEW's regulations were directed to federal agencies dispensing funds,
but not to the recipient of the funds. Each federal agency was left to draft and
pass its own regulations and then to implement and enforce those regulations
upon the recipients of each agency's funds. Id. at 48.
95. The Civil Aeronautics Board was later disbanded and the majority of its
functions were transferred to the Department of Transportation under the Civil
Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703. DOT v.
PVA, 477 U.S. 597, 599 n.3 (1986).
96. 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1374(a)'(1982 & Supp. 1986).
97. DOT, 477 U.S. at 600. The CAB had concluded that its authority under
section 504 was applicable only to those few airlines that received a federal sub-
sidy under section 406(b) or section 419 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
However it relied on section 404 in an attempt to circumvent this. Id. at 600 and
n.6. Section 404 has two sections which the CAB considered relevant in making
this decision. Id. at 601. Section 404(a)(1) provides:
It shall be the duty of every air carrier to provide and furnish inter-
state and overseas air transportation ... upon reasonable request
therefor; . . . to provide safe and adequate service, equipment, and
facilities in connection with such transportation . . . ; to establish,
observe, and enforce just and reasonable individual and joint rates,
fares, and charges, and just and reasonable classifications, rules, reg-
ulations, and practices relating to such air transportation ....
49 U.S.C.A. § 1374(a)(1) (West 1976). Section 404(b) provided that "No air carrier
or foreign air carrier shall make, give or cause any undue or unreasonable prefer-
ence or advantage to any particular person . . . or subject any particular per-
son . . . to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." Id. §1374 (b). See also infin note 99.
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assistance."8 The CAB relied upon both of these general
statements to support its conclusion that it had regulatory
authority over the activities of all air carriers."9
Following consultation with the Attorney General of the
United States and the solicitation and receipt of public com-
ments, the CAB concluded that its authority was limited by
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'00 Therefore, it con-
cluded that any specific regulations it promulgated would be
applicable only to air carriers who received federal financial
assistance.'0 ' The CAB's proposed regulations were revised
and issued in three subparts.
0 2
The first of those subparts, section A, prohibited dis-
crimination against qualified handicapped persons in air
transportation.0 a The second subpart, section B, contained
specific requirements which must be followed by air carriers
providing service to disabled persons and refers to specific
procedures for assuring the accessibility of aircraft and reser-
vation services, availability of information to deaf passengers,
procedures for blind persons travelling with guide dogs, and
guidelines for transporting wheelchairs.'0 4 The third
subpart, section C, contained specific compliance and admin-
istrative enforcement procedures.0 5 In issuing its final
98. DOT, 477 U.S. at 601.
99. Id. CAB relied upon these general statements even though it was aware
that the antidiscrimination provision of section 404(b) would lapse as of January
1983 under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. 1I.
100. Id. at 602.
101. Id.
102. 14 C.F.R. § 382.3 (1982).
103. Id. § 382.1-382.5. These proposed regulations defined a qualified handi-
capped person with respect to air transportation to be a "handicapped person:
(1) Who tenders payment for air transportation;
(2) Whose carriage will not violate the requirements of the Federal Aviation
Regulations . . . or in the reasonable expectations of carrier personnel . . . jeopar-
dize the safe completion of the flight or the health or safety of other persons;
and
(3) Who is willing and able to comply with reasonable requests of airline
personnel or, if not, is accompanied by a responsible adult passenger who can
ensure that the requests are complied with. A request will not be considered
reasonable if:
(i) It is inconsistent with this part or
(ii) It is neither safety-related nor necessary for the provision of air
transportation.
Id.
104. Id. §§ 382.10-382.15.
105. Id. §§ 382.20-382.25.
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regulations, the CAB concluded that only section A would be
applied to all air carriers. Sections B and C, the specific re-
quirements for providing service to handicapped passengers,
would only be applicable to the extent authorized by section
504, or to those air carriers who received federal subsi-
dies." 6
In response to these regulations, the Paralyzed Veterans
of America and two other organizations representing disabled
persons brought suit challenging the CAB's decision that its
rulemaking authority was limited by section 504.107 The
court ruled in favor of PVA, vacated the existing regulations,
and instructed the Department of Transportation, successor
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, to issue new regulations that
would apply to all air carriers, commercial as well as
non-commercial.'0 8 In reaching its decision, the court found
that air carriers received federal financial assistance from two
sources. The first source of assistance was that provided to
airports through the Airport and Development Act of
1970.'0° Second, the court found that the air traffic control
system in place at all major airports was another source of
federal financial assistance provided to airlines."0 There-
fore, the court of appeals found that the CAB had authority
over all air carriers under section 504."'
After this ruling, the Department of Transportation ap-
pealed the court's decision."' In 1986, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and addressed the issue of
whether the non-discrimination provisions of section 504 are
applicable to commercial airlines in Department of Transporta-
tion v. Paralyzed Veterans of America."3 The Supreme Court
held that the requirements of section 504 are not applicable
to commercial airliners which are not direct recipients of
federal financial assistance." 4
106. Id. § 382.2.
107. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Cisil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). The plaintiffs in this case will hereinafter be referred to as PVA.
108. Id. at 724-25.
109. Id. at 712.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. DOT, 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
113. Id. The Supreme Court decided this case 6-3.
114. Id. at 612-13.
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In reversing the lower court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court focused on the issue of whether or not com-
mercial airlines are recipients of federal financial assistance
as mandated in order to be bound by the requirements of
section 504."15 The financial funds in question are those
given to airport operators through the Airport Airway Im-
provement Act of 1982 and through a Trust Fund created by
the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970.11 These
funds were intended to be used for airport facilities' im-
provements such as construction of runways and terminals
and are not given directly to any specific airlines. Therefore,
the Supreme Court concluded that the airport operators
were the recipients of the financial assistance." 7 Thus, the
Court determined that the airport users, commercial airlines,
were not recipients of federal financial assistance as required
by section 504." l '
Second, the Supreme Court analyzed Congress' intent
behind section 504. The Court concluded that Congress had
used language limiting section 504's requirements to recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance as a means of indicating
its intent to "impose § 504 coverage as a form of contractual
cost of the recipient's agreement to accept the federal
funds.""' The Supreme Court found that Congress had
intended compliance with regulations under section 504 as
consideration for the receipt of federal financiai assistance.
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress im-
posed section 504 obligations upon those in a position to
accept or reject those obligations as part of their decision to
receive federal funds. 120 The only parties in the position to
115. Id. at 604.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 605.
118. Id.
119. Id. The Court stated that "Congress apparently determined that it would
require contractors and grantees to bear the costs of providing employnment as a
quid pro quo for the receipt of Federal funds." Id. "Under the program specific
statutes, Title V1, Title IX, and § 504, Congress enters into an arrangement in the
nature of a contract with the recipients of the funds; the recipient's acceptance of
the funds triggers coverage under the nondiscrimination provisions." Id.
120. Id. at 606. The Court felt that Congress limited coverage of section 504
to "recipients" of federal financial assistance in order to impose the obligations of
section 504 upon those in a position to accept or receive those obligations as part
of their decision to receive the funds. Id.
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make that decision in this case, according to the Court, were
the airport operators, not commercial airlines.'
2
'
Third, the Supreme Court found that commercial air-
lines were merely beneficiaries of federal financial assistance,
and not "indirect recipients" of federal aid as contended by
PVA.121 PVA contended that because airport operators
were "direct recipients" of financial assistance to build run-
ways and terminals under the above two mentioned im-
provement acts, all airlines should be considered "indirect
recipients" of that aid because they actually used the runways
and terminals. However, the Supreme Court held that section
504 requirements were applicable only to "direct recipients"
of federal financial assistance.'2 Therefore, the require-
ments were found to be inapplicable to commercial air-
lines.'
24
Finally, the Supreme Court found that air traffic control-
lers are federal employees and that the operation of their
facilities is financed by the federal government. 125 The low-
er court had found that this federally funded system of air
traffic controllers constituted a form of federal financial assis-
tance to commercial airlines.' 26 However, according to the
Supreme Court, the national system of air traffic controllers
is "owned and operated" by the United States and, as such,
is a federally conducted program. 127 It is not a recipient of
federal financial assistance. 28 Therefore, the Supreme
121. Id. at 607. The language of section 504 limits its coverage to programs or
activities that receive federal financial assistance. The Court felt that the airport
operators were the actual recipients of federal funds under the Airport and
Airway Improvement Act of 1982 and under a Trust Fuid established by the Air-
port and Airway Development Act of 1970. According to the Court, the recipient
airport operators' acceptance of the federal funds triggered the nondiscrimination
provisions of section 504. In other words, because the air carriers did not receive
federal funds, there was no requirement to comply with the nondiscrimination
provisions of section 504. The Court relied on this same rationale in Grove City
College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) in which it stated that the recipient of the
federal financial assistance was free at any time to terminate its participation in a
federal grant program and avoid the requirements of Title IX. Id. at 605.
122. Id. at 606.
123. Id. at 607.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 611.
126. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics BI., 752 F.2d 694, 712
(D.C. Cir.).
127. DOT, 477 U.S. at 612.
128. Id. at 611. According to the Supreme Court, the federally provided air
1026 [Vol. 30
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Court concluded that commercial airlines were not recipients
of federal financial assistance as mandated by section 504
and not subject to its non-discriminatory provisions.12 9
2. The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986
Several months later, in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in DOT v. PVA, Congress amended section
404 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. t"0 The Air Carrier
Access Act of 1986 provides for a general prohibition of
discrimination against qualified'' disabled persons in the
provision of air transportation.' The key to this Act is
that all air carriers are covered by its provisions, regardless
of their status as recipients of federal financial assistance.
The legislative history of the Act, specifically Senate Re-
port 99-404, indicates that although the Act does not prohib-
traffic control system is a program which has many beneficiaries but no recipients.
Id. The Court relied upon the Legislative History of Title VI, which states that
such programs do not constitute federal financial assistance to any one person. In
doing so, the Court concluded that the national system of air controllers is
.owned and operated" by the United States and is a federally conducted program,
not a recipient of federal financial assistance. Id. See id. at 611 n.14, for a discus-
sion of the court of appeals' rationale which concluded that the federally funded
system of air traffic controllers did constitute federal financial assistance.
129. Id. at 612.
130. 49 U.S.C. §1374(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
131. The final regulations published by the Department of Transportation de-
fine a qualified handicapped person as one who:
(a) With respect to accompanying or meeting a traveller, use of
ground transportation, using terminal facilities, or obtaining informa-
tion about schedules, fares or policies, takes those actions necessary
to avail himself or herself of facilities or services offered by an air
carrier to the general public, with reasonable accommodations, as
needed, provided by the carrier;
(b) With respect to obtaining a ticket for air transportation on
an air carrier, offers, or makes a good-faith attempt to offer, to pur-
chase or otherwise validly obtain such a ticket;
(c) With respect to obtaining air transportation, or other servic-
es or accommodations required by this part:
(1) Purchases or possesses a valid ticket for air transportation
on an air carrier and presents himself or herself at the airport for
the purpose of traveling on the flight for which the ticket has been
purchased or obtained; and
(2) Meets reasonable nondiscriminatory contract of carriage
requirements applicable to all passengers.
55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8047 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §382 and 49 C.F.R. §27).
132. 49 U.S.C. §1374(c) (1982 & Supp. 1986). For text of the Air Carrier
Access Act of 1986, see supra note 13.
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it specific practices by air carriers, its intent is that airlines
will not impose any restrictions on disabled air travellers
which are unrelated to safety or the individual's disabili-
ty.'3 3 Furthermore, the Senate Report indicates that Con-
gress intended to eliminate any inconsistency in services pres-
ently being offered by different air carriers, or by the same
air carrier on different flights. 4
The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 provides that within
one hundred and twenty days after its enactment the Secre-
tary of Transportation would promulgate regulations to en-
sure non-discriminatory treatment of qualified disabled per-
sons.'3 Proposed regulations were published in June, 1988;
final regulations were published on March 6, 1990.136
The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 was enacted to fulfill
several specific purposes. First, the statutory amendment was
enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in DOT
v. PVA.' s7 Senator Robert Dole stated that the "purpose of
the legislation ... is quite simple. It overturns the recent
Supreme Court decision in the case of Paralyzed Veterans Asso-
ciation v. Department of Transportation.""8 Second, it re-
sponded to the practical effect of that decision, which was to
"render inoperative and inapplicable Department of Trans-
portation regulations which had attempted to set forth imple-
133. S. REP. NO. 400, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2331 (1986). The Legislative History of the Air
Carrier Access Act of 1986 states that the Act "does not mandate any compromise
of existing DOT or Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] safety regulations." Id.
The amendment itself directs the Department of Transportation to "ensure
non-discriminatory treatment of qualified handicapped individuals consistent with
the safe carriage of all passengers in air carriers." The Air Carrier Access Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 3, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §1374(c)
(Supp. 1986)).
134. S. REP. NO. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2331 (1986).
135. The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080
(codified at 49 U.S.C. §1374(c) (Supp. 1986)).
136. 55 Fed. Reg. 8008. The final regulations which became effective on April
5, 1990, contain general and administrative provisions concerning physical facilities
and services to be provided to passengers with disabilities. The regulations apply
to all carriers who provide transportation. Id.
137. See S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, eprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2329-30 (1986).
138. 132 CONG. REc. 11784 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Dole
presenting Senate Bill 2703). Senate Bill 2703 became the Air Carrier Access Act
of 1986.
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menting regulations for air carriers.""3 9 Without any regula-
tions in place at all, disabled air travellers had no. protections
against discriminatory acts by air carriers. Third, the Act
sought to eliminate the lack of uniformity in airline policies
regarding service to disabled persons. 4 ' Fourth, as Senator
Dole stated, it sought to accomplish all of this in a manner
that is consistent with the safe carriage of all passengers. 4'
However, neither the statute nor the proposed regula-
tions address the availability of a private right of action to
disabled persons in order to redress acts of alleged discrimi-
nation under the Act. The Act does provide for administra-
tive enforcement procedures.'4 2 Without access to the
courts, however, disabled persons are left without an effective
method to protect themselves against potential acts of dis-
crimination.
139. 132 CONG. REc. 11784, 11785 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Dole).
140. Id. at 11787 (daily ed. August 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Cranston:
"Complaints of inadequate training of airlines personnel and'lack of uniformity in
policies relating to transportation of disabled persons and in the implementation
of such policies clearly indicates that there is considerable progress to be made ill
the air transportation industry before it can be concluded that air travel in this
nation is appropriately accessible to all of our citizens.")
141. 132 CONG. REC. 11784, 11786 (daily ed. August 15, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Dole).
142. The regulations provide that each air carrier shall establish a complaint
resolution mechanism. The procedure must include several elements. First, each
airline shall designate a complaints resolution official (the "CRO") for each airport
at which it provides service. The CRO must be available either in person at the
airport or by telephone and has authority to resolve complaints of alleged viola-
tion of the regulations on behalf of the air carrier. If the complaint is made to a
CRO prior to the carrier's action, the CRO directs carrier personnel to take
action in compliance with the regulations. However, CRO's are not authorized to
override the decision of a pilot-in-command who has excluded a passenger from
flight based upon safety reasons. If a violation of these regulations has already oc-
curred, the CRO must provide a written summary of the action and any correc-
tive steps that the carrier must take. If the CRO determines that no violation
occurred, lie or she must provide the complainant with a written statement and
explanation to that effect.
Second, each carrier must establish a procedure for resolving written com-
plaints and must respond to such complaints in writing within 30 days. Complain-
ants may appeal the decision of the complaints resolution official to the Office of
the Secretary of Transportation whose determination is final. 55 Fed. Reg. 8008,
8054 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §382 and 49 C.F.R. §27).
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III. ANALYSIS
The state of the law governing the rights of disabled air
travellers is unclear. The 1970's marked the beginning of a
specific civil rights movement on behalf of individuals with
disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in general and
section 504 of the Act in particular provided disabled indi-
viduals with access to federally funded programs, activities,
and employment opportunities.143 The United States Su-
preme Court recognized a private right of action under sec-
tion 504, thereby giving disabled individuals access to the
federal courts to redress acts of discrimination. By so doing,
the Court affirmed the idea that a violation of section 504
constitutes a violation of the civil rights of disabled individu-
als.144
In 1986, however, a stunning blow was dealt to the dis-
abled community when the United States announced its deci-
sion in DOT v. PVA. 45 The Court retreated from its earlier
decisions by holding that the non-discrimination provisions of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to com-
mercial airlines which were not direct recipients of federal
financial assistance. 4 ' This decision eliminated the require-
ment of nondiscrimination for airlines. 47 Although section
404(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 imposes a duty
on air carriers to provide safe and adequate service, "it is
unclear whether that language itself is enough to support
143. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1982 & Supp. 1986). See supra notes 33-44 and accompa-
nying text.
144. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
145. 477 U.S. 597 (1986). See supra notes 90-129 and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. The lack of such a requirement not to discriminate against persons with
disabilities in the provision of air transportation has restricted the ability of dis-
abled persons to travel freely by air in a time when air travel is a necessity not
only for pleasure, but for business. As Representative Howard stated: "The
nation's economy, as well as its political, social, and cultural life is very closely
tied to the air transportation system. Equal and nondiscriminatory access to the
air transportation system is vital to economic opportunity for all citizens and to
participation in the political, social and cultural life of our country." 132 CONG.
REC. 7194 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statement of Rep. Howard). Furthermore,
Representative Snyder stated that: "travel by air is a means of transportation
which should be ma(d]e available to all Americans without discrimination. Air
travel is not a luxury but a necessity in today's world." 132 CONG. REC. 7194
(daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statement of Rep. Snyder).
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specific and detailed anti-discrimination rules." 4 As a re-
sult, after DOT v. PVA, disabled air travellers were faced with
the possibility of discriminatory, unpredictable, and inconsis-
tent treatment by air carriers.
Disabled rights advocates believe that disabled travellers
are subjected to requirements neither related to safety nor
imposed upon other air travellers.' 49 Additionally, policies
for accommodating disabled travellers can vary from one air-
line to another or even within any one airline.15° Disabled
air travellers are often faced with inadequately trained airline
representatives, inequity among airline services, flat refusals
of service, and arbitrary policies and procedures. Therefore,
the disabled have no way of predicting in advance what con-
ditions may be imposed upon them when travelling by
air.
15 1
Congress recognized the inequity of the Supreme Court's
decision in DOT v. PVA and moved swiftly to correct the
injustice which had occurred. 52 Within four months of the
Supreme Court's decision, it enacted the Air Carrier Access
Act of 1986. In doing so, Congress recognized that "everyone
must be served in air transportation in a manner appropriate
to their abilities."
53
The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 was enacted with the
specific purpose of overturning the Court's decision in DOT
v. PVA. 54 Furthermore, the effect of the decision was to
148. S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2329 (1986). For the text of section 404(a) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, see supra note 99.
149. S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2329 (1986).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2330.
152. 132 CONG. REG. 7194 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Ackerman that the Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America
ruling was a "major setback for all people with disabilities and a shameful retreat
front our national effort to combat discrimination in this country . . . . The
unfortunate Supreme Court decision left Congress with no choice but to change
the law and undo the damage that the Court has done.").
153. 132 CONG. REC. 11784, 11786 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Dole).
154. d. at 11784 (statement of Sen., Dole: "the purpose of the legislation is
quite simple. It overturns the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Para-
lyzed Veterans of America versus the Department of Transportation); Id. at 11786
(statement of Sen. Cranston: "[i]n passing this measure . . . the United States
Senate would be rejecting in a remarkably swift and decisive fashion the Supreme
1990] 1031
1032 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
"render inoperable the Department of Transportation regula-
tions which had attempted to set forth implementing FAA
regulations for air carriers."'55 Since regulations were appli-
cable only to airlines receiving direct federal financial assis-
tance, most of the airline industry was left without cover-
age.' 56
Following the elimination of these regulations, the indus-
try was left with no guidelines for assuring the provision of
air transportation to disabled air travellers. Although the Act
provided that within one hundred and twenty days the De-
partment of Transportation would promulgate regulations to
assure such compliance with the Act, nearly four years
passed prior to the passage of such regulations. Proposed
regulations were issued on June 22, 1988; final regulations
were issued on March 6, 1990.'1
5
Neither the Act nor the implementing regulations pro-
vides disabled individuals with a private right of action to
redress alleged acts of discrimination. The regulations pro-
vide for administrative procedures for enforcement only.
151
Court's decision in the case of Paralyzed Veterans of America versus the Depart-
ment of Transportation."); 132 CONG. REC. 7194 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (state-
ment of Rep. Edgar: "This legislation is in response to the recent Supreme Court
decision in the case of U.S. Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans
of America, which held that "nonfederally subsidized commercial air carriers are
not required to adhere to antidiscriminatory statutes under current law.").
155. 132 CONG. REc. 11784, 11785 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement by
Sen. Dole).
156. Id. Since very few commercial airlines, if any, receive a federal subsidy,
most airlines lie beyond the reach of section 504 in the wake of DOT v. PVA.
However section 406(b) of the Federal Aviation Act created a program which
provided air service to transport mail to small communities. That program ended
in 1982. The CAB began another program under section 419 of the Federal
Aviation Act which was to subsidize small community air service. This program
was to end in 1988. These were the two major sources of federal financial assis-
tance to airlines and they reached only a very small percentage of the airline
industry. See DOT v. PVA, 477 U.S. 597, 601 n.6 (1986).
157. 55 Fed. Reg. 8008 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382 and 49
C.F.R. § 27). See supra note 17.
158. d. at 8049. The provision of administrative enforcement procedures
under the proposed regulations may suggest that Congress did not intend to
provide for an implied private right of action. Several courts have stated in inter-
preting section 404(a) of the Federal Aviation Act that "[b]ecause of the Act's
emphasis on administrative regulation. . ... it is highly improbable that 'Congress
absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private right of action.'" Anderson
v. US Air, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting In Re Mexico City
Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 407 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Luc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979)). However,
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The statute itself is silent on the issue of enforcement. 59
Administrative enforcement procedures have not proven ef-
fective in conjunction with section 504, and will likely not be
effective in enforcing violations of the Air Carrier Access Act
of 1986."60 Under section 504, responsibility for enforce-
ment is given to agencies which fund the particular program
suspected of discrimination.' 6 ' A particular compliance
agency is responsible for both enforcing section 504, as well
as implementing the programs a section 504 complaint will
attack. Therefore, there is an unavoidable conflict of interest
which prevents stringent enforcement of section 504.162
Furthermore, since close relationships develop between agen-
cies and the programs which they fund, it is unlikely that the
agencies will act impartially when enforcing section 504.163
These same problems will likely surface when the Depart-
ment of Transportation attempts to administratively enforce
the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.
Until now, the civil rights of disabled individuals have
been gained through battles in this nation's courts. Without
a mechanism for accessing the courts to redress grievances
suffered under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, disabled
persons are powerless to achieve equality of access in air
transportation. Disabled individuals must be able to access
the court system if this Act is to be interpreted and protec-
tion is to be provided in the manner intended by Congress.
IV. PROPOSAL
Neither the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986,64 nor the
regulations providing for its implementation, establish a pri-
vate right of action for disabled individuals to obtain com-
at least four United States courts of appeals have recognized implied private rights
of action in provisions of the Federal Aviation Act in the years since Cort v. Ash.
See Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 567 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978); Hingson v.
Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984); Chumney v. Nixon, 615
F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980); Bratton v. Shiffran, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated
and remanded, 443 U.S. 903 (1979), reaffid on remand, 635 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir.
1980), ceit. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981).
159. 49 U.S.C. app. § 137 4(c) (Supp. V 1987).
160. Summary, Analysis & Commentary, supra note 42, at 265.
161. Summary, Analysis & Commentary, supra note 42, at 266.
162. Summary, Analysis & Commentary, supra note 42.
163. Summary, Analysis & Commentary, supra note 42.
164. 29 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c) (Supp. V 1987).
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pensation for alleged violations under the Act. Without this
access to the courts disabled individuals are left with no ef-
fective means of securing compliance with its requirements.
Therefore, the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 should be
amended to expressly provide disabled individuals with a
private cause of action to redress alleged violations of the
Act. In the alternative, the United States Supreme Court,
when faced with the issue, as it most certainly will be, should
imply a private right of action for disabled individuals by
using the four factor standard established in Cort v. Ash.'65
A. An Express Cause of Action
An amendment to the Act should retain the existing
language of the statute with some crucial exceptions. It must
specifically provide that disabled individuals who have faced
discrimination by air carriers in the provision of air transpor-
tation shall have access to the courts to redress such
grievances. Furthermore, it should allow for the possibility of
actual or punitive damages to redress violations of the stat-
ute. If a private right of action in federal court is expressly
provided in the Act, its requirements will be more readily
enforced by commercial airlines. Commercial airlines will be
more likely to comply with the requirements if there is the
possibility of a lawsuit and damages to redress non-compli-
ance than they will be with the threat of administrative en-
forcement. The mere fact that damages may be assessed for
violations of the Act should lead to compliance with its re-
quirements.
Therefore, to ensure that disabled individuals have a
statutory express right to action for violation under the Air
Carrier Access Act of 1986, the Act should be amended to
provide:
(c)(1) It shall be unlawful for any carrier to discrini-
nate against any otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
ual by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air
transportation.
(2) Jurisdiction for alleged violations of this Act shall
be found in the federal courts of the United States.
165. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For a discussion of the four factor test set forth in
Cori, see supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
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(3) Both actual and punitive damages shall be avail-
able to the qualified handicapped individual to redress
violations of this section.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (1), (2), and (3)
of this subsection the term "handicapped individual"
means any individual who has a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, has a record of such impairment, or is regard-
ed as having such an impairment.'
Enactment of this amendment would further Congress' goal
of providing equal access to commercial air transportation in
several ways. First, it would ensure that commercial airliners
view their non-discriminatory obligations more seriously. It
would further enhance the importance of these requirements.
Second, more importantly, it would provide disabled individ-
uals with access to the court system to redress violations of
yet another civil right. This method has proven most effec-
tive for disabled persons in achieving equality and access
thus far. To deny them such access would in itself be a de-
nial of their rights." 7
B. An Implied Right of Action
If Congress does not choose to amend the Air Carrier
Access Act of 1986, the United States Supreme Court will
most certainly be faced with deciding whether or not an
implied right of action exists under the Act. To eliminate the
possibility of inconsistent interpretations under the Act, the
Supreme Court must address this issue.'
In making its decision, the Court will most likely analyze
the issue using the four factor test established in Cort v.
166. This is the definition of "handicapped individual" contained in section
504 of tile Rehabilitation Act as well as in the final regulations issued by the
Department of Transportation to implement the Air Carrier Act of 1986. 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) & (Supp. V 1987); 55 Fed. Reg. 8008 (1990) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. § 382 and 49 C.F.R. § 27).
167. For a discussion of an implied private right of action under section 504,
see supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
168. As of the date of this writing, one court has found an implied private
right of action to exist to redress violations of the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.
Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989). In Tallaico, the
plaintiff was a minor with cerebral palsy who was not allowed to fly unaccompa-
nied on a flight for which she had already purchased a ticket. The court used the
four factor Coil analysis to find a private right of action to exist. Id.
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Ash.' 69 Although this test has been somewhat diluted in the
years since Cort was decided, it is still relied upon by the
Court to determine whether a cause of action should be
implied when a statute does not expressly so provide.
In determining whether to imply a private cause of ac-
tion under a statute, the Supreme Court looks primarily to
the intent of Congress when enacting that statute . 70 The
four factor Cort test is the method by which the Court deter-
mines such intent.' 7' By analyzing the Air Carrier Access
Act of 1986 in the context of these four Cort factors, the Su-
preme Court would most likely find that a private right of
action should be implied in favor of disabled individuals
facing discrimination by air carriers.
The first Cort factor, whether the plaintiff is one of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, certainly
favors the implication of a private right of action in favor of
disabled individuals facing discrimination by air carriers.'
72
In analyzing this factor, the Court will look to the language
and legislative history of the statute.
73
In this instance, the plaintiffs to be protected are dis-
abled individuals. The language of the statute expressly pro-
vides that the Act is for the benefit of "qualified handi-
capped individuals." 74 When a statute expressly names the
individuals to be protected from discrimination, it suggests
an intent to provide 'for a private right of action.77 Fur-
thermore, in its legislative history, Congress clearly stated its
169. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For a detailed discussion of the development of the
Cort four factor standard and its subsequent refinement, see supra notes 45-57 and
accompanying text.
170. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 13 (1981) ("The key to the inquiry is whether Congress intended to create
a private right of action under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.");
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S.
77, 91 (1980) ("The ultimate question . . . is whether Congress intended to create
the private remedy . . . that the plaintiff seeks to invoke."); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ("[O]ur task is limited solely to determining
whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted . . ").
171. For a statement of the four factors determined in Cort to be controlling
when deciding whether a private right of action should be implied if a statute
does not expressly provide for one, see supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
172. Coil, 422 U.S. at 78.
173. Id. at 88.
174. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c) (Supp. V 1987). For the definition of "qualified
handicapped individuals," see supra note 131.
175. Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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intent to prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals
in the provision of air transportation. 176 Senator Alan
Cranston expressed this purpose in his remarks to the Unit-
ed States Senate when he stated that the Air Carrier Access
Act of 1986 ensured that disabled individuals are not dis-
criminated against by airlines.' 77 Therefore, it is clear that
Congress intended the class of disabled individuals to benefit
from the enactment of the Act.
The second Cort factor, whether there is any indication
of legislative intent to create or deny a remedy to the plain-
tiff, also favors the implication of a private right of action in
favor of disabled individuals. 71 In Cort, the Court suggest-
ed that an analysis of the legislative history of the statute
would be the proper method for determining whether this
factor is met.
79
First, an examination of the legislative history of the Air
Carrier Access Act of 1986 indicates Congress' express inten-
tion to repeal the Supreme Court's decision in DOT v.
PVA. '8 Senator Robert Dole, in his Floor Speech to the
176. S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2329; 132 CONG. REc. S11,784, 11,787 (daily ed.
Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (The purpose of this legislation is
"to eliminate discrimination in services provided to handicap[ed] [sic] individuals
by airline carriers."); 132 CONG. REC. H7193 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statement
of Rep. Mineta) ("The bill now before us, S. 2703, will make it clear that airlines
may not discriminate against handicapped persons.").
177. 132 CONG. REc. S11,784, 11,786 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Cranston) (He is delighted to support this legislation "to ensure that individu-
als with disabilities are not discriminated against by airlines.").
178. Con, 422 U.S. at 78.
179. Id. at 78. See 132 Cong. Rec. H7194 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statement
of Rep. Ackerman)
Although I believe additional reforms may be needed to ensure that
disabled individuals are able to use an airline's services, equipment
and facilities, and obtain equitable relief from an airline which vio-
lates the law and unjustly discriminates, I believe that the legislation
before us is a good basis from which to begin our efforts to elimi-
nate inconsistent and unfair airline procedures.
This statement certainly indicates a recognition by Congress that persons with
disabilities require further rights under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 to
enforce its nondiscriminatory policies. A private right of action would be such an
additional right.
180. 477 U.S. 597 (1986). See S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong, 2nd Sess. 4, reprint-
ed in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2329-30; 132 CONG. REC.
S11,784, 11,787 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); 132
Cong. Rec. S1,784, 11,784 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Dole);
132 Cong. Rec. S11,784, 11,786 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
United States Senate stated that the purpose of the Act was
to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in DOT v.
PVA.'81 Furthermore, Senator Cranston, in his remarks to
the, Senate, characterized the passage of the Act as a rejec-
tion in a "remarkably swift and decisive fashion" of the
Court's decision in DOT v. PVA.'
The ruling in DOT v. PVA left disabled air travellers
without the protections against discrimination provided by
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Congress' swift
and intentional overturning of the Court's ruling in DOT v.
PVA indicates that it intended to provide disabled air travel-
lers with the remedies provided under section 504183 prior
to the DOT v. PVA ruling. A private right of action has al-
ready been implied under section 504."84 Therefore, the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to create
such a remedy for disabled individuals.
Second, the Air Carrier Access Act of 19868' is mod-
eled after section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.' 8 As Sena-
tor Dole stated, it relies heavily upon language and prece-
dents from the Rehabilitation Act.1 7 The Supreme Court
has already recognized an implied private right of action
under Section 504."'8 "The courts which have considered
the issue have uniformly held that section 504 creates a pri-
vate cause of action for those who are its intended beneficia-
ries."189 Therefore, it would be consistent for the Court to
imply a right of action under the Air Carrier Access Act of
1986.
Third, the swift manner in which Congress addressed the
issue of the Act is a further indication of its intent to create
a remedy in disabled individuals. The Supreme Court decid-
ed DOT v. PVA on June 27, 1986, and the Air Carrier Access
Cranston).
181. 132 CONG. REC. S11,784, 11,784 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986)
Sen. Dole).
182. Id. at 11,786 (statement of Sen. Cranston).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
184. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
185. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(c) (Supp. V 1987).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
187. 132 CONG. REC. S11,784, 11,785 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986)
Sen. Dole).
188. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
189. Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036, 1040 (6th Cir. 1983).
(statement of
(statement of
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Act was enacted on October 2, 1986. Congress had recog-
nized that "Air transportation obviously is a most important
component of our society and full access to it is vital to
millions of individuals' pursuit of business and personal mat-
ters."190
The third Cort factor, whether it is consistent with the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff, also strongly favors the implication
of a private right of action in favor of disabled individu-
als. 9 ' Congress' primary purpose in enacting the Air Car-
rier Access Act of 1986 was to eliminate acts of discrimina-
tion against disabled air travellers.192 Furthermore, section
1304 of the Federal Aviation Act, provides that "there is a
recognized and declared to exist on behalf of any citizen of
the United States a public right of freedom of transit
through the navigable airspace of the United States."' A
private right of action would allow disabled individuals access
to ensure fulfillment of the rights guaranteed by that statute.
Furthermore, at least four United States courts of appeals
have implied a private right of action under various other
sections of the Federal Aviation Act.'94 Therefore, the im-
plication of a private right of action would be consistent with
the underlying purposes and actions of Congress and the
courts.
The fourth Cort factor, whether the cause of action is
one traditionally relegated to state control, also supports the
implication of a private right of action in favor of disabled
individuals under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.195
The Department of Transportation has been given authority
to promulgate regulations under the Act. An airline's duty to
comply with these regulations and provide air transportation
in a non-discriminatory fashion is derived from this federal
statute. Furthermore, the federal government has taken a
190. 132 CONG. REC. S11,784, 11,787 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Cranston).
191. Coil, 422 U.S. at 78.
192. S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328, 2329.
193. 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
194. For a discussion of courts which have implied a private right of action
under other sections of the Federal A%iation Act of 1958, see supra note 158.
195. Col, 422 U.S. at 78.
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role of leadership in the enforcement of civil rights legisla-
tion. Section 504 has established the protection of disabled
individuals as an area of federal concern. Therefore, the
regulation of non-discrimination against disabled persons in
air transportation should be an area of concern of the feder-
al government..
By analyzing the above four factors, the Court would
undoubtedly determine that a private right of action should
be implied under the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.
C. Damages
If the Court implies a private right of action under the-
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, actual compensatory and
punitive damages should be available for travellers with dis-
abilities who prove violations of the Act have occurred.
96
Both types of damages have already been granted to redress
violations of section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act."7
In such an instance, punitive damages are available if the
defendant airline has acted "wantonly or oppressively or with
such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indif-
ference to civil obligations."' 98
Finally, disabled travellers should be able to establish a
cause of action in state court for damages for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or in the alterna-
tive, for negligence or negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.19 9 At least one United States court of appeals has
held that a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is not preempted by a federal claim under the Fed-
196. Actual compensatory damages for violation of a disabled person's right to
travel may include compensation for "plain and blatant instances of humiliation
and outrage suffered." Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 366
(S.D. Cal. 1961).
197. Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1408, 1412 (9th Cir.
1984); Karp v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 87, 90 (E.D. Wis. 1977),
affid, 583 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1978). In deciding to allow an award of punitive
damages, the court made reference to civil rights legislation which grants a private
right of action, but which makes no express provision for damages. The implica-
tion of damages was allowed on the premise that in tort actions punitive damages
have been allowed where circumstances warrant, irrespective of enabling legislation.
Wills, 200 F. Supp. at 367.
198. Id. at 367.
199. This cause of action would be in addition to alleging a violation of the
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.
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eral Aviation Act. °° In addition, one court has allowed
damages for emotional distress for an airline's violation of
the Air Carrier Access Act.20'
V. CONCLUSION
This comment has presented a history of the implication
doctrine, which allows a court to imply a private right of
action when a statute does not expressly provide for one.
The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, which prohibits discrim-
ination by air carriers against disabled persons in the provi-
sion of air transportation services, does not expressly provide
for a private right of -action. Without such access to the
court system, disabled individuals are virtually powerless to
redress grievances which have occurred under the Act.
Therefore: (1) the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 should be
amended to expressly provide for a private right of action;
or in the alternative, (2) the United States Supreme Court
should imply a private right of action using the four factor
test it established in Cort v. Ash. Furthermore, the Act should
provide for compensatory and punitive damages including
damages for plaintiffs who sue in state courts based upon
the theories of intentional infliction or negligent infliction of
emotional distress. "Without judicial intervention to re-
dress . . . violations of the statute, the rights of air passen-
gers as declared in the Act, to travel without .. .unjust dis-
200. Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1416. To establish a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must establish: (1) severe emotional dis-
tress; (2) intentional or reckless extreme and outrageous conduct; and (3) causa-
tion. Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88 (1970). In the case of air travellers with disabilities, conduct
which arbitrarily deprives them of their right to travel by air is "outrageous". It
would certainly be considered outrageous to deny a non-disabled traveller access
to air travel for no apparent reason. By establishing the existence of such ele-
ments due to a violation of the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, disabled travellers
would have an additional avenue by which to redress alleged acts of discrimina-
tion by air carriers. If the infliction of emotional distress is not intentional, dis-
abled travellers may be able to recover damages for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress by establishing the following elements: (1) that the defendant
air carrier had a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) that the defendant airline
breached that duty of care; (2) that the breach of that duty actually and proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's damage; (4) damages.
201. Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989).
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crimination would be robbed of vitality and the purposes of
the Act substantially thwarted."
2 12
Elizabeth E. Tweedie
202. Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 364 (1961).
